Riyadh (Somalia Today) — Saudi Arabia is moving to deepen security coordination with Egypt and Somalia as it seeks to reinforce Red Sea stability and counter the United Arab Emirates’ influence across the Horn of Africa and Yemen, according to a Bloomberg report.
Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud is expected to travel to Saudi Arabia soon to finalise elements of the arrangement, Bloomberg said, citing people familiar with the discussions.
Riyadh, Cairo and Mogadishu have not announced the talks publicly, and the scope of any alliance remains unclear.
However, the discussions come as the Gulf rivalry between Saudi Arabia and the UAE sharpens over Yemen, ports and influence along one of the world’s most strategic maritime corridors.
Red Sea stakes
The Red Sea and Gulf of Aden link Asia, the Middle East and Europe, with Egypt’s Suez Canal at the northern end and the Bab el-Mandeb strait at the southern choke point.
Saudi Arabia treats maritime security as a core priority, and Somalia’s long coastline gives it strategic weight in any Red Sea security plan.
Somalia’s federal government is also under pressure at home as it continues to fight the al-Shabab insurgency and struggles to impose authority across all regions.
The alliance talks follow a surge in Saudi-UAE tension in Yemen. On December 30, Saudi Arabia struck Yemen’s port city of Mukalla, saying it targeted a weapons shipment arriving from the UAE for the separatist Southern Transitional Council (STC). The UAE rejected the claim. The incident widened a split between the two states.
After the strike, the UAE said it would withdraw its remaining forces from Yemen. Saudi Arabia moved to reinforce support for Yemen’s internationally recognised government and pledged new development funding for southern provinces.
The STC, backed for years by Abu Dhabi, rejected claims it is disbanding. Its leader, Aidarous al-Zubaidi, remains a central figure in the movement.
Somalia-UAE rupture
The Yemen crisis has also spilled into the Horn of Africa.
On Monday, Somalia’s federal government said it was annulling agreements with the UAE, including port, defence and security arrangements, accusing Abu Dhabi of undermining Somali sovereignty.
Somali authorities also opened an investigation into allegations that Somalia’s airspace and airports facilitated the movement of a “fugitive political figure”—a reference to claims that al-Zubaidi transited through Somali territory on his way to the UAE.
The UAE has built deep relationships in Somalia’s regions, investing in ports and logistics while also supporting Somali security forces.
In Somaliland, DP World has said its operations at Berbera port remain unaffected by Mogadishu’s decision, underscoring how commercial activity can continue even as political ties fray.
Somaliland, Puntland and Jubadland—all of which maintain close ties with the UAE—rejected Mogadishu’s move and signalled they would continue cooperation with Abu Dhabi, highlighting Somalia’s internal divisions at a moment of rising regional pressure.
Israel’s December 26 announcement recognising Somaliland as an independent state has further complicated the picture, triggering condemnation from Somalia and criticism from African and Muslim-majority institutions.
The decision has also intensified concerns in Cairo and Riyadh that new security alignments could emerge along the Gulf of Aden as Israel focuses on threats linked to Yemen’s Houthi movement.
Somaliland President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi “Irro” recently rejected Arab diplomatic outreach aimed at reversing the Israel deal, saying relations with Israel were a sovereign decision. He also set recognition of Somaliland as a precondition for any talks.
Cairo’s calculus
Egypt’s interest is rooted in geography and doctrine. The Suez Canal is a strategic economic lifeline, and Egyptian security policy has long treated instability along the Red Sea as a direct threat.
Regional reports have also suggested closer coordination between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, including claims that Cairo shared intelligence with Riyadh on Emirati-linked activity in Yemen. Egyptian and Saudi officials have not publicly confirmed such cooperation.
Even without a formal announcement, any Saudi-Egypt-Somalia framework would sit alongside older Arab collective-security concepts, including the Arab League’s 1950 Joint Defence treaty, which remains politically significant but has rarely produced an integrated military capability.
Ports and logistics sit at the heart of the contest for influence around the Red Sea.
The UAE has used port investments and security partnerships to deepen its footprint along the maritime corridor, including in Berbera and Bosaso, tying Gulf trade and security interests to local Somali administrations.
Saudi Arabia has increasingly framed its own approach around state-to-state diplomacy and the need to prevent rival security alignments from taking root along its maritime approaches.
Analysts say Somalia has become a focus for wider regional competition, spanning Yemen’s political future and the implications of Israel’s new ties in Somaliland.
What comes next
For Mogadishu, closer coordination with Saudi Arabia and Egypt could bring diplomatic weight and security support as it confronts the fallout from Somaliland’s recognition and seeks greater control over foreign-linked security and port arrangements.
But the same shift could deepen internal Somali rifts as regional administrations maintain their own external partnerships and commercial operators signal continuity on the ground despite political disputes.
In Riyadh, the talks underline how Saudi-UAE competition has expanded beyond private disagreement into open strategic contestation, stretching from Yemen’s southern ports to Somalia’s northern coastline.
Whether the proposed alliance becomes a binding pact or remains a political signal, diplomats say its timing matters: the region is reshaping Red Sea security in real time, and the Horn of Africa now sits at the centre of those calculations.
