Washington (Somalia Today) — Somaliland has long argued that Berbera, minerals and its position near the Red Sea make it too important for the world to ignore. A new US State Department report points to a different reality: those assets cannot be fully unlocked while Hargeisa refuses to work with Somalia’s recognised national government.
The report to Congress acknowledges Somaliland’s strategic and commercial value. It cites Berbera’s ports and airport, possible opportunities in minerals, infrastructure, trade and exports, and the region’s location near Yemen and the Bab al-Mandab Strait.
But its most important line may be its warning.
“Regional security concerns and the dispute over Somaliland’s status, including its refusal to cooperate with national authorities, present challenges for investment, banking, and trade,” the report said.
For supporters of Somali unity, that sentence carries more weight than another routine statement of US support for Somalia’s sovereignty. It pushes the issue beyond diplomacy and into economics.
Washington is not only placing Somaliland within Somalia’s recognised borders. It is also warning that Hargeisa’s current approach creates practical barriers to the investment and trade it has been seeking.
That is a serious blow to Somaliland’s long-running strategy.
Legal limits
Somaliland’s leaders have spent years presenting the region as a stable, useful and strategically placed partner for foreign powers.
They have promoted Berbera as an alternative port for landlocked Ethiopia, highlighted mineral potential including lithium and coltan, and argued that the region can help secure one of the world’s most important maritime corridors.
That pitch has weight. The United States clearly sees potential value in Somaliland’s geography, ports and resources. The report says Berbera could create opportunities for US investment, exports and commercial activity.
But it also makes clear that potential does not equal bankable reality.
Large-scale international investment needs more than ports and minerals. It needs legal certainty, recognised authority, banking channels, insurance, enforceable contracts, sovereign guarantees and clear dispute mechanisms.
For Washington, those issues still run through the Federal Republic of Somalia, the internationally recognised state.
That is why the report’s reference to Somaliland’s refusal to cooperate with “national authorities” is significant. In diplomatic language, those national authorities are in Mogadishu, not Hargeisa.
Ahmed Abdi, a Mogadishu-based analyst, said the report exposed a critical flaw in Somaliland’s strategy.
“For years, Somaliland’s leadership has operated on the assumption that if they built the infrastructure and attracted enough foreign interest, whether from the UAE, landlocked Ethiopia or the US, de facto autonomy would eventually force international recognition,” Abdi said.
“But this report makes clear that the lack of legal integration with Mogadishu is no longer just a political dispute. It is an active economic liability.”
He said major US investment in mining or logistics would remain stuck in the “potential” stage without international financial mechanisms, sovereign guarantees and legal protections that only a recognised state can provide.
Mogadishu’s argument
The report also strengthens the Federal Government of Somalia’s central argument: that foreign engagement with Somaliland cannot bypass Somalia’s sovereignty.
Somalia has long warned that deals involving ports, military facilities or natural resources in Somaliland cannot stand outside the national framework.
Hargeisa rejects that position, saying Somaliland has operated independently since 1991 and has the right to enter agreements on its own.
The US report does not settle the political dispute. But it shows where Washington’s legal framework remains anchored.
That sends a clear signal to companies, banks and governments looking at Berbera or Somaliland’s mineral claims: the political dispute is not background noise. It is part of the investment risk.
Yusuf Matan, a Horn of Africa researcher in Mogadishu, said the report validates Somalia’s long-standing position that geopolitical ambition cannot override international legal frameworks.
“Washington clearly sees the strategic and economic value of Berbera’s infrastructure and Somaliland’s untapped mineral wealth,” Matan said.
“But it explicitly tethers those opportunities to the reality of Somalia’s sovereignty.”
He said the State Department’s assessment reflected a basic fact about international capital.
“International capital is fundamentally risk-averse,” Matan said.
“The report’s blunt assessment that Hargeisa’s refusal to cooperate with national authorities creates structural barriers for banking and trade is a clear signal that Somaliland’s unilateral approach is reaching its natural limits.”
Go-it-alone limits
The report leaves room for US engagement with Somaliland on security, commerce and regional stability. It does not tell Washington to cut off contact with Hargeisa. Nor does it deny that Somaliland has strategic value.
But it draws a line between engagement and recognition, and between possible investment and legally secure investment.
That distinction matters.
Somaliland’s argument has often rested on the belief that if enough outside powers deal with Hargeisa directly, recognition will eventually follow.
The US report suggests the opposite may happen: the more serious the investment, the more the legal question matters.
That creates a difficult choice for Somaliland.
It can continue trying to bypass Mogadishu and hope strategic geography eventually forces a diplomatic breakthrough. Or it can accept that some level of cooperation with Somalia’s recognised national authorities may be necessary to unlock the investment it seeks.
For Mogadishu, the message is clear. Somalia’s sovereignty is not only a political slogan in Washington. It remains the legal framework through which serious investment, banking and trade are judged.
That is why the report is bigger than a statement on recognition.
It suggests Somaliland cannot turn Berbera, minerals and foreign lobbying into economic power while leaving Somalia’s recognised state out of the equation.
