Mogadishu (Somalia Today) – China is moving closer to Somalia as Mogadishu battles the Al-Shabaab militant group and navigates an increasingly internationalised dispute over the breakaway region of Somaliland, underscoring Beijing’s growing interest in the Horn of Africa.
During talks in Mogadishu this week, Chinese special envoy Hu Changchun said Beijing was ready to deepen political trust, expand practical cooperation and strengthen coordination on peace and security.
He also reiterated China’s support for Somalia’s sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity. Somalia, in turn, reaffirmed its adherence to the “One China” policy and expressed its desire for broader cooperation with Beijing.
In a recent analysis, Brendon J. Cannon, an associate professor at Khalifa University, said China’s growing support for Somalia appeared to be driven by two overlapping considerations.
One, he said, is the strategic value of the Horn of Africa, which sits along shipping routes linking the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea. The other is Beijing’s effort to counter Taiwan’s diplomatic foothold in Somaliland.
Cannon said China had recently pledged to widen military support for Somalia, including training and equipment, marking a shift from Beijing’s traditionally limited presence in the country.
Territorial integrity
China’s interest in Somalia is not new. Beijing sent warships to waters off Somalia in late 2008 to join anti-piracy patrols, and in 2017, it opened its first overseas military base in neighbouring Djibouti.
But the political setting has evolved rapidly in recent years.
In 2020, Taiwan and Somaliland opened representative offices in each other’s capitals, angering both Beijing and Mogadishu.
In April 2025, Somalia barred Taiwanese passport holders from entering, leaving or transiting the country, with the foreign ministry saying the measure reflected Somalia’s commitment to the One China principle.
After Israel became the first country to formally recognise Somaliland in December 2025, China moved quickly to reaffirm its support for Somalia’s territorial integrity and denounced what it described as Somaliland’s “collusion” with Taiwan.
Cannon argued that, from Beijing’s perspective, support for Somalia is increasingly tied not only to regional strategy but also to its long-standing campaign to isolate Taiwan diplomatically.
He said the Horn of Africa has become a place where geopolitical competition, questions of sovereignty and regional security are converging.
That convergence has drawn China closer to Mogadishu, whose federal government has repeatedly stressed the “One Somalia” principle in response to Somaliland’s push for international recognition.
Selective footprint
Despite the diplomatic alignment, Beijing remains a selective strategic partner in Somalia rather than a transformational one.
Recent bilateral statements have focused on sovereignty, peace and security coordination, fisheries and the blue economy rather than the large-scale infrastructure projects that once defined China’s rise elsewhere in East Africa.
According to Boston University data, Chinese lending to Africa nearly halved in 2024 as Beijing shifted towards smaller and more targeted projects.
That narrower profile sets China apart from other external powers that already have a deeper footprint in Somalia.
Turkey, which opened its largest overseas military base in Mogadishu in 2017, agreed in 2024 to provide direct maritime security support to help Somalia defend its waters.
The United Arab Emirates has also trained and funded Somali forces, although Mogadishu announced in January that it was scrapping security and port agreements with Abu Dhabi over sovereignty concerns.
A recent study by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point said China’s security cooperation in Africa has remained cautious, technical and politically deferential, with an emphasis on influence-building rather than high-visibility combat roles.
That approach, Cannon said, suggests Beijing’s involvement in Somalia is likely to be shaped as much by diplomatic objectives as by operational military goals.
Crowded arena
Whether closer ties with China will significantly alter Somalia’s fight against Al-Shabaab remains unclear.
Somalia’s defence ministry said this week that its forces killed 27 militants in the Jubba regions, but the Al-Qaeda-linked group still controls swathes of rural territory and remains a potent security threat.
A new African Union mission, AUSSOM, was authorised in January to replace the previous force, underlining Somalia’s continued reliance on external support in its campaign against the insurgents.
Cannon said there was little reason to expect Chinese military assistance to succeed where other forms of foreign support had struggled to deliver decisive results.
Its greater impact, he argued, may be political.
For China, standing behind Mogadishu is consistent with a core foreign policy principle: opposition to separatist movements and support for territorial integrity.
For Somalia, Chinese backing offers diplomatic support at a time when the Somaliland question is drawing wider international attention.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi had planned to visit Somalia in January, in what would have been the first such trip since the 1980s, before he postponed it, a sign of how far relations had risen on Beijing’s agenda.
But a larger Chinese role is unlikely to displace the interests of Turkey, Gulf states and Western powers in Somalia.
Instead, it adds another layer to an already fragile regional contest shaped by security cooperation, shipping routes, diplomacy and competing claims of sovereignty.
For Mogadishu, that may bring new backing on the international stage. But it also risks placing Somalia more firmly at the centre of a widening geopolitical rivalry in the Horn of Africa.
