Mogadishu (Somalia Today) – Washington is preparing to ease sanctions on Eritrea not because Asmara has changed, but because the Red Sea has.
For years, Eritrea was viewed in Washington as a closed, repressive and difficult state. Its government was accused of severe rights abuses, its economy remained isolated, and its role in Ethiopia’s Tigray war deepened its status as a pariah.
But the United States is now looking at Eritrea through a colder strategic lens.
The country sits on one of the world’s most important maritime corridors. It has a long Red Sea coastline, ports at Massawa and Assab, and a position close to Bab el-Mandeb, the narrow passage linking the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean.
That geography has become far more valuable after repeated shocks to global shipping, tensions around Iran and the Strait of Hormuz, Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, Sudan’s war and Ethiopia’s renewed push for access to the sea.
In short, Washington is betting on Eritrea because it needs more options in a region where ports, chokepoints and military access are again shaping global power.
The move does not mean Washington suddenly trusts President Isaias Afwerki, who has ruled Eritrea since its independence in 1993. Nor does it mean Eritrea is becoming a normal U.S. ally.
It means the United States has decided that leaving Eritrea outside the diplomatic game may now carry a higher strategic cost than engaging it.
Red Sea pressure
The Red Sea crisis has changed the value of coastal states.
For the United States, the route from the Mediterranean through Suez, the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb is not only a trade corridor. It is a security artery linking Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Asia.
When that artery is threatened, geography becomes policy.
Eritrea’s Assab port is especially important. It lies close to Bab el-Mandeb and has previously attracted regional military interest, including from Gulf powers during the Yemen war.
Its location gives any outside power a potential platform near one of the most sensitive maritime chokepoints in the world.
That matters more today because Washington is watching two chokepoints at once.
The Strait of Hormuz remains central to Gulf energy exports and any confrontation involving Iran. Bab el-Mandeb, meanwhile, controls traffic moving between the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea and the Suez Canal.
If both routes come under pressure, the United States needs deeper influence across the western and eastern shores of the Red Sea.
Eritrea cannot replace existing U.S. partners such as Djibouti, Egypt, Saudi Arabia or the Gulf states. But it gives Washington another card in a crowded corridor where China, Russia, Turkey, the Gulf states, Egypt, Israel and Iran all have interests.
That is why Eritrea has become difficult to ignore.
A country once treated as diplomatically inconvenient has become strategically useful. Its value is not based on political reform or trust, but on location, access and the ability to shape the balance around one of the world’s most contested maritime routes.
Ethiopia factor
Eritrea also gives Washington leverage in managing Ethiopia.
Ethiopia remains one of Africa’s most important states: populous, militarily significant and economically influential. But its renewed demand for access to the sea has alarmed the region, especially Eritrea.
Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has repeatedly said Ethiopia needs access to the sea. Although Addis Ababa says it does not seek war, the language has unsettled Asmara because Ethiopia lost its coastline when Eritrea became independent in 1993.
For Eritrea, any discussion of Ethiopian sea access touches an existential concern. For Washington, it creates a risk that one of Africa’s most volatile borders could again become a flashpoint.
Opening the door to Asmara, therefore, sends a message to Addis Ababa: Ethiopia remains important, but it is no longer the only centre of U.S. thinking in the Horn of Africa.
The goal is not to abandon Ethiopia. Washington cannot afford that. Ethiopia is too large, too influential and too important to regional security.
The goal is to create balance.
By easing pressure on Eritrea while keeping Ethiopia engaged, Washington gains leverage over both sides. It can warn Ethiopia against any military adventure over ports while reassuring Eritrea that it is not being left alone against its larger neighbour.
This is also a low-cost form of diplomacy.
The sanctions imposed on Eritrea after the Tigray war carried political weight, but they did not destroy Eritrea’s economy. The country was already highly closed and had limited exposure to Western financial systems.
Their main impact was diplomatic. They branded Eritrea as an untouchable state and made serious U.S. engagement difficult.
Lifting or easing them creates room for talks without requiring Washington to offer a full alliance.
Human rights cost
The moral problem is obvious.
Eritrea has not held national elections since its independence. Its system of indefinite national service has driven large numbers of young people into exile.
Rights groups accuse the government of severe repression, while Eritrean forces were accused of grave abuses during the Tigray war.
Sanctions relief, therefore, risks rewarding a state that has not changed its behaviour.
But that is exactly what makes the shift revealing.
The Trump administration appears to be prioritising strategic geography over human rights conditionality. In that worldview, Eritrea’s ports and coastline matter more than its internal politics.
Washington is not betting on Eritrea because it trusts Afwerki. It is betting on Eritrea because the Red Sea crisis has made his country useful.
For Afwerki, the opening offers a rare opportunity.
He can present sanctions relief at home as proof that Eritrea resisted Western pressure and forced Washington to return. He can seek investment in ports, mining and infrastructure without promising political reform. And he can also use renewed U.S. interest to strengthen his hand in the tense balance with Ethiopia.
But Afwerki is unlikely to turn Eritrea into a conventional Western ally. His foreign policy has long rested on suspicion, self-reliance and tactical engagement with competing powers.
That may suit Washington for now.
The United States does not need Eritrea to become democratic. It needs Eritrea to be available, strategically placed and difficult for rival powers to monopolise.
The real calculation is simple.
Ethiopia is too important to lose. Eritrea is too strategically placed to exclude. Djibouti is already crowded with foreign bases. Sudan is consumed by war. The Red Sea is too contested for Washington to rely on old assumptions.
In that environment, geography has become power again.
And Eritrea has geography Washington can no longer afford to ignore.
