Hargeisa (Somalia Today) — Somaliland leader Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, known as Irro, says direct flights between Israel and Hargeisa will begin “very soon”.
The pledge fits the political message of his visit to Israel, but aviation law and recent events show why the route faces a difficult test: Somalia controls the internationally recognised airspace over Somaliland.
Irro made the remarks in an interview with i24NEWS during his visit to Israel, where he met senior Israeli officials and opened what his administration called Somaliland’s first “embassy” in Jerusalem.
The Hargeisa-based administration has presented the proposed flights as the next practical step after Israel recognised Somaliland’s independence claim in December 2025.
But a direct Tel Aviv-Hargeisa service is not simply a matter of political will on the part of Israel and the Somaliland authorities.
Scheduled international flights require accepted airspace permissions, flight plans, airline compliance procedures, insurance clearance, immigration checks and ground arrangements. In all of those areas, Somalia’s recognised federal authority matters.
Somaliland, a self-declared region in northwestern Somalia, controls Hargeisa airport on the ground. It can receive aircraft, process passengers and issue local entry documents.
But Hargeisa sits inside Somali territory as recognised by the international system, and flights into the city operate within the Mogadishu Flight Information Region.
That is where Irro’s pledge meets the legal and operational limits of Somaliland’s recognition campaign.
Can EL AL bypass Somalia?
The central question is whether Israel’s flag carrier, EL AL, or any other Israeli airline, could bypass Somalia’s air control and fly directly from Tel Aviv to Hargeisa.
Physically, an aircraft can fly from Israel towards the Horn of Africa through several possible routes. It could avoid large parts of Somali airspace until the final stage of the journey. But that does not remove the legal issue.
To land in Hargeisa, a commercial aircraft must enter airspace that international aviation systems treat as part of Somalia’s jurisdiction.
Under international aviation rules, states hold sovereignty over the airspace above their territory. Scheduled international air services also require permission or authorisation from the state whose territory they enter.
For the international aviation system, that state is Somalia.
This does not mean a plane can never land in Hargeisa without Mogadishu’s consent in practice.
Somaliland authorities control the airport and could receive an aircraft. But a regular scheduled commercial route is different from a symbolic landing, a private charter or a political visit.
A scheduled route needs recognised aviation procedures that airlines, regulators, insurers and passengers can rely on. That makes Somalia’s position difficult to bypass.
Somalia has leverage
This is not a theoretical problem.
Somalia has already shown that its recognised airspace authority can affect Israeli airlines.
Earlier this year, Israeli carrier Arkia said it had not received permission to fly through Somali airspace on its route to Thailand after Israel recognised Somaliland’s independence claim.
The airline said it regularly submits overflight requests as part of normal international aviation procedures, but had not received renewal for February.
Arkia said that if approval did not arrive, it would use an alternative route without changing passenger schedules.
Somalia later agreed to let Arkia resume transiting its airspace, and the airline said the approval took effect immediately.
That sequence matters for any promised Israel-Hargeisa route. It showed that Somalia could delay or withhold overflight clearance for an Israeli airline, even if permission was later restored.
It also showed that Israeli carriers rely on recognised Somali overflight approvals when using Somali airspace.
The same Israeli reports said EL AL did not expect immediate changes to its Thailand route because it had an annual Somali overflight approval that remained valid at the time.
But that detail reinforces the same point: even EL AL depends on overflight approvals when using Somali airspace.
A direct flight to Hargeisa would be more complicated than a transit route to Thailand. It would not merely pass over Somalia’s recognised airspace. It would land in a city Somalia regards as part of its territory.
The question, then, is not whether an Israeli aircraft can physically approach Hargeisa. The question is whether an airline can operate a regular commercial service while bypassing the recognised aviation authority that controls the airspace and flight-permission system.
The eVisa lesson
Somalia’s eVisa dispute gives another example of how federal systems can affect travel to Hargeisa even when Somaliland rejects them.
Somalia introduced an electronic travel authorisation system requiring foreign passport holders to obtain approval before travelling to the country.
Somaliland rejected the system and said visitors to Hargeisa should continue receiving visas on arrival at Egal International Airport.
But airlines have still asked some Hargeisa-bound passengers to present Somalia’s federal eVisa before boarding.
UK travel guidance says passengers travelling to Hargeisa may still be asked to show the Somalia eVisa to board their flight, even though Somaliland authorities do not consider it valid for entry on arrival.
US travel guidance also tells travellers to Somaliland that they may need to show a federal Somali eVisa to airlines, while Somaliland officials do not recognise it.
That has created a two-step reality for some travellers: a Somalia eVisa to board, then a Somaliland visa on arrival in Hargeisa.
The lesson is clear. Somaliland can politically reject Mogadishu’s authority, but international airlines often follow systems tied to recognised state authorities because they bear the boarding, return, and compliance risks.
The same logic applies to any proposed Israel-Hargeisa route.
Why the flight pledge matters
Irro’s direct-flight claim is part of a wider attempt to turn Israel’s recognition into practical links.
The Jerusalem mission, high-level meetings, security discussions and direct-flight pledge all send the same message from Hargeisa: recognition should now become operational.
For Somalia, the proposed flights touch the core areas of federal sovereignty: airspace, borders, immigration and foreign relations.
Mogadishu has already condemned Israel’s engagement with Somaliland, saying it violates Somalia’s sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity and constitutional order.
Somalia’s foreign ministry has also said the federal government remains the sole legitimate authority empowered to represent Somalia in international relations.
That position gives the airspace dispute political weight beyond aviation.
A direct Israel-Hargeisa service would not be a normal route announcement. It would test whether Israel and Somaliland can convert political recognition into a working aviation corridor while Somalia openly rejects the relationship.
What would have to happen?
For a regular Israel-Hargeisa flight to operate with legal and commercial stability, at least one of several things would have to happen.
Somalia could approve the route or quietly tolerate it, despite its public opposition. That appears unlikely under Mogadishu’s current position.
Israel and Somaliland could try to create a workaround through technical aviation arrangements, but airlines and regulators would still need enough legal comfort to operate the service.
Another option would be a one-off or irregular flight, which may be easier politically and operationally than a scheduled commercial route. But that would not be the same as launching direct flights in the usual airline sense.
Without a clear arrangement, EL AL or any other airline would face questions over airspace clearance, landing permissions, insurance, passenger documentation and compliance with recognised aviation rules.
Those are not small details. They are the foundation of international commercial aviation.
Political promise, aviation reality
Irro did not name the airline that would operate the flights. He did not provide a launch date, route structure or regulatory details. He also did not explain how the flights would deal with Somalia’s control of internationally recognised airspace.
That omission matters.
Direct flights from Israel to Hargeisa may be politically useful for Somaliland authorities, especially after Israel’s recognition. But they cannot be separated from Somalia’s aviation authority.
The Arkia case showed that Somalia can affect Israeli airline operations through overflight permissions, even when permission is later granted.
The eVisa dispute showed that federal Somali travel rules can reach passengers heading to Hargeisa even when Somaliland rejects them.
Together, those examples weaken the idea that direct Israel-Hargeisa flights can simply begin because Hargeisa and Tel Aviv want them.
Aircraft can fly around many things. Commercial airlines cannot easily fly around legal recognition, airspace authority and compliance risk.
That is why Irro’s statement should be read less as a confirmed aviation launch and more as a political pledge facing a difficult regulatory test.
Unless Somalia approves, tolerates or is somehow bypassed through an arrangement accepted by aviation regulators and airlines, direct commercial flights from Israel to Hargeisa will remain far harder to deliver than to announce.
