Tel Aviv (Somalia Today) — A new paper from Israel’s Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) is urging Tel Aviv to deepen Somaliland ties quietly while holding back from early recognition of the breakaway territory.
Published in Hebrew on November 18, the study argues that Somaliland offers Israel a rare pro-Western partner on the Gulf of Aden at a time of mounting Red Sea insecurity.
Written by Horn of Africa specialist Asher Lubotzky, the paper is titled “Somaliland and Israel – Considerations on Recognition and Cooperation.”
It frames Somaliland as a de facto state that has built a more stable and democratic system than the rest of Somalia, yet still lacks international recognition.
The author weighs arguments for and against Israel becoming one of the first countries to recognise it and concludes that cautious, low-profile cooperation would best serve Israeli interests.Â
Red Sea stakes
The INSS analysis situates Somaliland inside a wider “Horn of Africa and Red Sea” arena whose importance to Israel has grown since Yemen’s Houthi movement began attacking shipping in October 2023.
Those attacks have hit commercial vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden and triggered repeated Western air strikes on Houthi targets along the Yemeni coast.
For Israeli planners, the paper notes, the security of the Bab al-Mandab Strait and nearby sea lanes has become a central concern.
Against that backdrop, the study describes Somaliland as a relatively secure enclave on the African shore.
Since declaring independence from Somalia in 1991, it has built its own institutions, held multi-party elections, and, according to Lubotzky, largely avoided the jihadist insurgency that has plagued southern Somalia.
A 2024 presidential election delivered a peaceful transfer of power, which the paper presents as further proof of internal stability.
The author highlights the expansion of Berbera port on the Gulf of Aden, developed with investment from Dubai-based operator DP World, as a sign of Somaliland’s growing economic and strategic weight.
He suggests that, in the long term, the territory could play a role for Israel similar to that of Azerbaijan on Iran’s northern flank, offering a platform for intelligence cooperation, maritime awareness, and discreet logistics.
Caution on recognition
Despite this largely positive assessment, the paper advises Israel not to be the first state to recognise Somaliland as independent.
Lubotzky warns that unilateral recognition would clash with the United States’ long-standing position backing Somalia’s territorial integrity and could put Israel at odds with African Union and Arab League members worried about secessionist precedents.Â
Mogadishu has repeatedly insisted that Somaliland remains part of Somalia.
Tensions spiked on January 1, 2024, when Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding with Hargeisa that promised sea access around Berbera in exchange for possible future recognition.
Somalia’s government rejected the pact as illegal, recalled its ambassador, and later passed a law nullifying the agreement. At the same time, international mediators warned of broader regional risks.Â
The INSS study argues that, in this environment, an Israeli move on recognition would likely provoke sharp reactions from Somalia and several Arab capitals and could even limit Somaliland’s room to manoeuvre.
It notes that the Gaza war and the Red Sea crisis have already fuelled public anger toward Israel across the Muslim world, making any visible upgrade in Israel–Somaliland relations especially sensitive.
Instead, Lubotzky advocates a “below-the-radar” engagement strategy. He proposes that Israel expand contacts on security, trade, and development while working with Washington and key Gulf partners, particularly the United Arab Emirates, to shape any longer-term move on recognition.
In his view, recognition led or backed by the United States would provide political cover and reduce the risk that Israel is isolated as a first mover.
Lobbying and regional politics
The November paper also places Israel’s debate inside a broader shift in Western thinking about Somaliland.
Over the past decade, Somaliland leaders and diaspora activists have courted United States lawmakers and think tanks, presenting the territory as a Muslim-majority democracy that can help counter extremist groups and balance Chinese influence in nearby Djibouti.
A 2021 report by the Heritage Foundation, for example, urged Washington to recognise Somaliland and treat Berbera as a strategic hedge.Â
Lubotzky notes that Donald Trump’s return to the White House in January 2025 has raised hopes in Hargeisa that the United States might finally break with three decades of non-recognition.
Conservative policy blueprints, such as “Project 2025,” have included formal recognition of Somaliland as a goal. However, the current administration has not announced any decision.
Reporting in the US and African media has pointed to exploratory discussions over deeper American access to Berbera in exchange for diplomatic upgrades.
For Somalia’s federal government, the INSS paper underlines a worrying trend. The question of Somaliland’s status is increasingly being framed abroad as a strategic issue linked to the Red Sea and great-power competition, rather than only as an internal constitutional dispute.
Somali officials have warned that foreign deals with Hargeisa on ports, bases, or recognition risk undermining the fragile federal order and empowering separatist agendas.
For Somaliland’s new leadership, the analysis reads as both encouragement and restraint. It reinforces the message that the territory can act as a responsible security partner in a volatile corridor between the Suez Canal and the Indian Ocean.
At the same time, it signals that the decisive step toward full recognition is likely to depend on calculations in Washington and regional capitals, not just in Tel Aviv.
