Addis Ababa (Somalia Today) — An Ethiopian state think-tank says Somalia’s president has swung behind Addis Ababa’s “two waters” grand strategy, arguing that Hassan Sheikh Mohamud now backs both Ethiopia’s Nile mega-dam and its push for Red Sea access.
In a new paper, Ethiopia’s Institute of Foreign Affairs (IFA) reads Mohamud’s recent diplomacy as a “diplomatic pivot” in Ethiopia’s favour and a step-change in ties between Addis Ababa and Mogadishu.
The claim goes further than anything Somali officials have said in public.
Think-tank reading
The analysis by IFA researcher Miftah Mohammed Kemal leans heavily on two moments in 2025.
First is Mohamud’s decision to attend the GERD inauguration on 9 September, when Ethiopia formally opened its Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam on the Blue Nile.
He joined other regional leaders in Addis Ababa as Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed cast the project as a regional power hub.
Second is a televised interview with Saudi-owned Al Arabiya days later. In the interview, Mohamud described the GERD as “pivotal” for development in the Horn of Africa and welcomed dialogue around the dam’s operation, according to regional coverage of the remarks.
The IFA paper stitches those signals together. It says Mohamud’s language shows Somalia now sees the GERD as a “regional hub for power connectivity”, and that his comments on Ethiopia’s Red Sea ambitions amount to endorsement of Addis Ababa’s long-running quest for sea access.
That reading sits inside Ethiopia’s broader “two waters” doctrine, a strategic narrative that links control of Nile waters at the GERD with renewed access to the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.
The concept has been developed in IFA material and in speeches by Abiy and his advisers. It is increasingly cited in Ethiopian debates about national security.
From rift to reset
Ethiopia’s think tank is also keen to show how far relations with Somalia have shifted in a short time.
On 1 January 2024, Addis Ababa signed a port memorandum with Somaliland, the self-governing northern region that Somalia still claims as its own territory.
The deal offered Ethiopia access to a stretch of coastline near Berbera in exchange for possible recognition of Somaliland’s independence.
Mogadishu denounced the agreement, recalled its ambassador, and pushed through a law nullifying the pact, describing it as a violation of Somalia’s sovereignty.
For most of 2024, the two governments traded accusations while regional partners scrambled to cool the crisis. Kenya floated a maritime treaty to set rules for landlocked states’ access to ports.
The breakthrough came in December, when Turkey brokered the Ankara Declaration, a joint text in which the leaders of Ethiopia and Somalia pledged to restore ties, respect each other’s territorial integrity, and handle disputes through dialogue.
A follow-up visit by Mohamud to Ethiopia in January 2025, then his return for the GERD ceremony nine months later, is presented by the IFA as proof that the reconciliation is now deep enough for Somalia to back Ethiopia’s core security concerns.
Somalia’s tightrope
Somali and independent readings are more cautious.
In his Al Arabiya interview, Mohamud did praise the GERD as “transformative” and spoke of regional power interconnection, in line with his decision to attend the inauguration.
But analysts who reviewed the full exchange noted that he also stressed international rules and sovereignty when discussing sea access.
According to a Horn Review analysis, the Somali leader welcomed dialogue on Ethiopia’s Red Sea concerns yet warned that any arrangement must respect “universally accepted standards” and the territorial integrity of all states.
That position is consistent with Mogadishu’s stance since the Somaliland deal: Ethiopia can negotiate commercial access with Somalia’s federal government, officials say, but not through separate agreements that appear to recognise Somaliland’s statehood.
Somalia has not publicly adopted the language of a “two waters” doctrine. Officials tend instead to describe their diplomacy as a balance between defending borders, keeping regional routes open, and drawing in investment for ports, power, and transport.
Even so, for Ethiopia, any public praise of the GERD by a coastal neighbour is politically useful. It undercuts Egyptian efforts to rally support against the dam. It helps Addis Ababa tell a story in which upstream and downstream states can share benefits.
Regional stakes
The stakes are high for both sides.
Ethiopia, the world’s most populous landlocked country, relies heavily on Djibouti for its seaborne trade.
In Addis Ababa, strategists increasingly argue that this dependence is a strategic vulnerability and that Ethiopia needs a menu of port options along the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.
The “two waters” framing seeks to tie that agenda to hydro-politics on the Nile, presenting the GERD as both a symbol of sovereignty and a bargaining chip in regional power trading.
A series of papers and speeches from IFA and other Ethiopian bodies have sharpened this doctrine over the past two years.
Critics, however, see dangers in turning two contested issues into a single grand strategy.
Commentaries in the region warn that aggressive rhetoric around “two waters” risks fuelling nationalism and miscalculation, especially when layered onto existing tensions with Egypt, Eritrea, and now Somalia.
For Somalia, there is also a fine line between normalising ties with Ethiopia and appearing to favour one camp in the broader Nile and Red Sea rivalries.
Mogadishu’s growing security and economic links with Cairo – a fierce critic of the GERD’s current operation – underline that balancing act.
Diplomats say the real test will be whether warm words become concrete projects. That could mean long-term power purchase deals from the GERD, joint investments in cross-border lines and roads, or a negotiated framework for Ethiopian use of Somali ports that both parliaments can live with.
For now, Ethiopia’s foreign-policy establishment is keen to frame Somalia as a new supporter of its “two waters” vision.
Whether Somalis – and their other regional partners – accept that description is still an open question.
