Aden (Somalia Today) — Yemen’s southern separatist leader, Aidarous al-Zubaidi, has disappeared from public view after the Saudi-led coalition announced he failed to board a Riyadh-bound flight for crisis talks, prompting Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) to expel him and refer him to prosecutors on accusations including “high treason.”
The coalition said Zubaidi fled to an “unknown location.” The Southern Transitional Council (STC), which he heads, countered that he remained in Aden, the southern port city that serves as the internationally recognised government’s interim capital and the STC’s main stronghold.
The uncertainty has fed competing claims about whether Zubaidi stayed inside Aden, moved to his home province of al-Dhalea, or sought a discreet exit by sea towards Somalia—an idea raised by a Yemeni government adviser but not backed by publicly available evidence.
Flight no-show
The latest confrontation comes as Saudi Arabia attempts to contain a fast-moving southern escalation that has pitted key anti-Houthi partners against each other, raising the risk of renewed infighting across areas outside Houthi control.
Coalition spokesperson Turki al-Maliki stated that the coalition command ordered Zubaidi on January 4 to travel to Saudi Arabia within 48 hours.
The summons was intended for a meeting with PLC chairman Rashad al-Alimi and coalition leaders following clashes and deployments by STC-aligned forces in eastern governorates.
Regional outlets carried the coalition’s account that Zubaidi went to the airport on January 6 and signalled his intent to travel, but ultimately did not board a Yemenia flight after it was delayed for several hours.
Zubaidi’s absence has clouded the talks Saudi Arabia planned to host on the “southern issue,” which Yemen’s government hoped Riyadh would sponsor to defuse tensions and organise a broader southern dialogue.
Treason case
On Wednesday, the PLC issued a decree removing Zubaidi from the council and referring him to the prosecutor general, with state media reporting accusations that included “high treason” and inciting armed rebellion.
The decision accused Zubaidi of attacking constitutional authorities and committing abuses against civilians in southern Yemen—language that signals a sharp escalation between nominal partners within the Saudi-backed governing camp.
The PLC, formed in April 2022, aimed to unify the anti-Houthi front under a single executive body after then-president Abedrabbo Mansour Hadi transferred his powers to an eight-member council.
Zubaidi joined as a member representing the STC, which had previously clashed with government forces in the south, even as it fought the Houthis in the broader war.
The coalition said it carried out “limited” pre-emptive air strikes in al-Dhalea, Zubaidi’s home province, after monitoring the movements of armed forces that had left their camps. Local and STC-linked sources reported more than 15 strikes in the area.
The Southern question
Zubaidi leads a movement rooted in Yemen’s long-running southern grievances regarding unification in 1990 and the failed southern secession attempt in 1994.
The STC, established in 2017 with UAE backing, has consistently pushed for a renewed bid for southern self-rule or independence, even as the internationally recognised government has insisted on Yemen’s unity.
Saudi Arabia previously sought to contain similar crises through the 2019 Riyadh Agreement, which aimed to end fighting in Aden and fold rival forces into state structures.
Implementation has repeatedly faltered, leaving overlapping chains of command and competing security forces across the south.
That fragility has been exposed again in recent weeks. A surge of fighting and territorial manoeuvres in southern and eastern Yemen has abruptly altered the balance among anti-Houthi factions and complicated Saudi efforts to keep the southern file contained.
Gulf allies diverge
The confrontation also highlights the strain between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the two Gulf powers that intervened in Yemen in 2015 after the Houthis seized Sanaa the year before.
Riyadh has prioritised restoring a unified state authority on its southern border, while Abu Dhabi has relied on local partners—including the STC—to shape security and influence in parts of the south.
Observers view the latest developments as triggering a major rift between the two countries and fracturing the coalition aligned with the internationally recognised government.
Reports indicate that STC forces seized swathes of territory last month, and that the UAE has since pulled its forces out under Saudi pressure while calling for de-escalation.
Somalia speculation
Against that backdrop, a Yemeni adviser’s suggestion that Zubaidi could try to reach Somalia by small boat has drawn attention because the Gulf of Aden forms a narrow maritime corridor between Yemen and the Horn of Africa.
But the Somalia scenario remains unverified. The coalition has not explicitly stated Zubaidi left Yemen; the STC insists he stayed in Aden, and no independent reporting has confirmed a sea departure or arrival.
What is well documented is that smugglers regularly move people across this same body of water.
The International Organisation for Migration and migration monitors describe persistent “Eastern Route” movements between the Horn of Africa and Yemen, alongside frequent shipwrecks and risks of abuse.
Those patterns indicate the existence of sea routes that are difficult to fully police.
They do not, however, provide evidence that Zubaidi used them, and responsible reporting requires treating Somalia as a possibility raised by a local adviser rather than a confirmed destination.
Humanitarian crisis
Any renewed southern confrontation would unfold on top of one of the world’s deepest humanitarian crises.
The UN’s Yemen page notes that more than 19 million people required humanitarian assistance in 2025, while the Global Humanitarian Overview 2026 projected even higher needs for the year ahead.
Aid agencies have also warned that Yemen’s response has suffered major funding shortfalls, limiting the ability to scale up relief as front lines shift and displacement risks rise.
For now, Saudi Arabia’s push for talks has collided with a leadership vacuum on the STC side, a treason case opened by the PLC, and coalition strikes that both parties frame as defensive.
Until Zubaidi appears publicly—or credible evidence emerges about his movements—the question at the centre of the crisis remains unanswered.
