Dubai (Somalia Today) – Iran is increasingly targeting the strategic radar and communications systems that underpin US-led air defences across the Gulf, aiming to blind the network tracking its missiles and drones.
The tactical shift comes after the United States and Israel launched major strikes on Iran on February 28, sparking a widening regional war.
The conflict has disrupted global air travel and energy flows, drawing in Gulf Arab states that host US forces or cooperate with Washington on security.
Recent Iranian retaliatory strikes have hit or damaged highly sensitive radar, air defence, and communications sites in Qatar, Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia, according to US officials, military analysts, and satellite imagery reported by The Wall Street Journal.
The pattern suggests Tehran is deliberately trying to weaken the vital sensor layer that feeds early-warning data to Patriot and THAAD missile batteries, rather than relying solely on brute-force ballistic missile barrages.
Targeting the shield
One of the most significant reported strikes hit Qatar’s Al Udeid Air Base, the largest American military installation in the Middle East and the forward headquarters of US Central Command.
An Iranian strike damaged an AN/FPS-132 Block 5 early-warning radar at the base, The Wall Street Journal reported.
The massive, fixed radar is designed to detect ballistic missile launches up to 5,000 kilometres (3,100 miles) away, making it a cornerstone of the broader US and allied defensive architecture.
It is a rare and high-value strategic asset.
A US Defense Security Cooperation Agency notice from 2013 valued Qatar’s purchase of the radar and related support at approximately $1.1 billion.
Jordan’s Muwaffaq Salti Air Base also appears to have been hit, with reports indicating an AN/TPY-2 X-band radar attached to a US Army THAAD battery was destroyed.
The AN/TPY-2, which costs an estimated $800 million, is a critical component of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, guiding interceptors toward descending ballistic missiles.
Without its dedicated radar, a THAAD battery cannot independently search for or track targets, severely degrading its effectiveness.
Commercial imagery also showed damage to radar domes at Camp Arifjan in Kuwait and a satellite communications system at the US Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain.
In Saudi Arabia, imagery reviewed by the newspaper showed smoke rising from a radar site at Prince Sultan Air Base.
The strikes underline the vulnerability of systems that are both costly and limited in number.
The US military currently operates only seven THAAD batteries globally, meaning localized damage can have severe operational consequences across the stretched regional air-defence network.
The financial trap
Iran’s focus on blinding radars comes as its use of cheap, one-way attack drones remains intense, creating a brutal economic trap for Washington and its allies.
Since the war began, Iran has launched hundreds of ballistic missiles and more than 1,000 drones at US-allied Gulf states, Reuters reported.
The cost imbalance has become a defining feature of the conflict.
A single Iranian Shahed-136 drone, powered by a simple piston engine, costs between $20,000 and $50,000 to produce.
To intercept it, US and allied forces often fire Patriot missiles costing roughly $4 million each, or THAAD interceptors priced between $12 million and $15 million.
Destroying a swarm of $50,000 drones with multimillion-dollar interceptors forces the defending side to expend vast resources, turning the conflict into a grinding war of attrition.
Analysts say Tehran can produce Shahed drones in massive numbers, having refined their design and swarm tactics through years of regional conflicts and military cooperation with Russia during the Ukraine war.
To mitigate this, the United States and Qatar are discussing acquiring lower-cost interceptor drones developed in Ukraine to counter the persistent Shahed waves.
Despite the strikes, US Central Command told The Wall Street Journal that the regional shield remains operational and that American forces maintain full combat capability.
Washington continues to rush replacement equipment and interceptors into the region.
A familiar warning
The current campaign echoes devastating lessons from the Gulf’s recent history.
In September 2019, a complex Iranian-linked attack using drones and cruise missiles bypassed Saudi air defences to strike the Abqaiq and Khurais oil facilities.
The surprise assault hit the world’s largest crude oil stabilization plant and temporarily knocked out 5.7 million barrels per day—roughly five percent of global oil supply.
It proved how low-flying munitions could penetrate localized point-defences with outsized global economic effects.
Since then, Washington has pushed for closer regional integration of radar and data-sharing systems among Gulf states and Israel.
But political sensitivities and a reluctance to share sensitive military data have slowed progress toward a unified missile shield.
That fragmentation makes Iran’s current strategy especially dangerous.
Radars are the eyes of any air defence network.
If they are damaged, blinded, or forced offline, defenders lose precious warning time, threat tracking becomes less reliable, and the burden on already scarce interceptor missiles rises dramatically.
In a war increasingly fought with layered salvos of drones and missiles, protecting the multimillion-dollar defences themselves has become just as critical as defending the bases and cities behind them.
