Asmara (Somalia Today) — Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki has issued a rare warning that an emerging “shadow alliance” linking Ethiopia, the United Arab Emirates and “Israel” is reshaping Red Sea security around militarised Yemeni islands and Somali ports.
In a televised interview on November 15, he said that Yemen’s islands and shores have become the main battleground in a regional power struggle. Red Sea security, he argued, “must be handled by littoral states, not foreign bases”.
His remarks came months after a U.S.–Houthi ceasefire deal halted months of U.S. airstrikes in Yemen. However, the deal left a dense web of military sites and proxy forces along the shipping lane.
More broadly, Afwerki linked Yemen’s protracted war and the recent Red Sea shipping crisis to a wider project of militarising key islands such as Socotra, Mayon, and Zuqar. He warned that this build-up threatens Eritrea, Egypt, Somalia, and any state that depends on the waterway.
The Eritrean leader said coastal states should only allow foreign military presence under collective agreements lodged with the United Nations.
He rejected bilateral deals that “rent out” islands and ports. Instead, he urged Egypt, Eritrea, Yemen, and Somalia to build their own capacities and coordinate under a shared legal framework that restores a leading role for coastal governments.
Rare warning
For regional analysts, the interview stood out. Afwerki rarely grants extended television interviews. Eritrea usually keeps its security doctrine opaque.
For example, Yemeni writer and political analyst Ahmed al-Shalfi called the comments “one of the clearest political messages” issued by any Red Sea leader in years.
Writing on X, he said this was the first time a head of state on the Red Sea had openly tied Yemen’s war to a project to militarise the maritime corridor. In his view, the aim is to sideline littoral states.
Al-Shalfi argued that Afwerki had “brought Somalia into the same frame”. He said the Eritrean leader portrays the fragility of the Somali state and the fragmentation of Yemen as part of a single regional map.
In that map, foreign bases and proxy forces, not sovereign coastal governments, redraw influence and control.
Today, Yemen sits at the centre of a wider contest. The same instability that allowed the Houthis to disrupt shipping after October 2023 now lets foreign militaries and private contractors entrench themselves on islands and coastlines. Previously, those areas fell firmly under Yemeni or Somali control.
Island bases
At the same time, Afwerki’s warning also coincided with new open-source reporting and satellite imagery. These reports track how the UAE, in coordination with “Israel”, has built a chain of military and intelligence sites from Yemen’s Socotra archipelago to ports on the Somali coast.
For instance, an investigation published by Middle East Eye and republished by the Iraqi think tank Hiwar Iraq describes how Abu Dhabi has developed a security belt.
It runs from Abd al-Kuri and Samha in Socotra to Mocha and Mayon in Yemen, and on to Bosaso and Berbera in Puntland and Somaliland.
According to the report, these sites host runways, radar, and facilities capable of handling heavy transports and drones. Together they form a network that monitors traffic through the Gulf of Aden and Bab el-Mandeb.
The investigation describes the system as a “dangerous shadow alliance” that turns Yemen into a shared sphere of influence for Abu Dhabi and “Israel”.
Meanwhile, Yemeni officials and analysts repeatedly link the Mayon airbase in the strait itself — long shrouded in secrecy — to Emirati-backed forces. No state formally claims it.
In addition, a separate Yemeni report quoted African affairs researcher Mohammed Saleh. He said Afwerki’s “central concern” is mounting pressure from Ethiopia over Eritrea’s Assab port. At the same time, reports of new bases on nearby Yemeni islands are emerging.
Moreover, Saleh said information about work on a base on Zuqar — a Yemeni island further north in the Red Sea — deepens fears in Asmara.
As a result, Eritrean officials worry that any new foreign installation could one day fold into Ethiopian manoeuvres backed by Gulf and Israeli partners.
Ethiopia’s sea quest
Ultimately, behind Eritrea’s alarm lies Ethiopia’s renewed push to break out of landlocked status.
Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has repeatedly described sea access as an “existential” need. More recently, he has sought international mediation with Eritrea over access to the Red Sea.
Addis Ababa’s quest has taken several forms. Ethiopia has pressed historic claims to Assab and hinted it might pursue alternatives if diplomacy fails.
It also signed a controversial memorandum of understanding with Somaliland in early 2024. That deal sought port access and a naval facility in exchange for symbolic recognition of Somaliland’s independence.
The move triggered a year-long rupture with Mogadishu. The federal government sees any seaport deal with Somaliland as a violation of Somalia’s sovereignty.
In March, Abiy told parliament that Ethiopia had “no desire to invade Eritrea” over Red Sea access. He tried to calm regional fears as troops massed on both sides of the border. At the same time, he said Ethiopia still needed a lasting solution to its sea access problem.
For Saleh and other analysts, this is where the Ethiopia–UAE–“Israel” triangle takes shape. They argue that Ethiopia leans on backing from Abu Dhabi and “Israel” as it pushes to re-enter the Red Sea and put pressure on Eritrea.
Fragile map
Crucially, Afwerki’s comments also pulled Somalia into the picture. Al-Shalfi and other Yemeni commentators say the Eritrean leader sees a single project playing out on both shores of the Gulf of Aden.
On the Yemeni side, many Red Sea islands have, in practice, slipped from the hands of any effective Yemeni state since 2014. Rival factions and their regional backers rotate forces through Hanish, Zuqar, and other islets.
On the African shore, Middle East Eye’s network investigation found that Bosaso and Berbera — ports in Puntland and Somaliland — now host UAE-linked installations and logistics hubs.
The investigation presents them as parts of the same system that connects Yemeni islands to the Horn.
Against this backdrop, Somali officials, already angered by Ethiopia’s Somaliland deal, see the growing patchwork of foreign arrangements along their northern coast as a direct challenge to federal authority. It also tests Somalia’s ability to regulate security partnerships on its own terms.
Meanwhile, Turkey-brokered talks between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa over sea access show how far Red Sea politics now reach inland.
The dispute cuts to the heart of questions of recognition, federalism, and state survival.
For Afwerki, al-Shalfi wrote, this is the essence of his “belated warning”. In his view, leaving Yemeni islands and Somali ports under de facto foreign control will erode maritime security for the whole region. It will also turn coastal states into spectators in their own waters.
Bab el-Mandeb
Here, geography makes the stakes obvious. Around one-third of global seaborne oil trade passes through Bab el-Mandeb each year. A significant share of container traffic also uses the narrow chokepoint between Yemen and the Horn of Africa.
Mayon Island, administered by Yemen, sits almost in the middle of the strait, splitting it into two channels.
That position makes it prime real estate for anyone who wants to monitor shipping, missile threats, or intelligence flows between the Red Sea and the wider Indian Ocean.
The March–May 2025 U.S. bombing campaign against the Houthis — followed by the May 6 ceasefire brokered by Oman — showed how quickly the strait can turn into a global flashpoint. The crisis drove up insurance costs and forced ships to reroute around Africa.
Afwerki argues that a security system built around foreign bases and ad-hoc coalitions will entrench, not ease, that volatility.
Instead, his alternative is a Red Sea order in which coastal states — from Egypt down to Somalia — coordinate directly on patrols, legal frameworks, and crisis response. Outside powers, he says, should only join under their umbrella.
For now, however, the Ethiopia, UAE, Israel, Red Sea axis he fears looks more consolidated. It appears stronger than any collective mechanism among the littoral states themselves.
As Ethiopian rhetoric on sea access hardens and satellite images reveal new installations on Yemeni and Somali soil, the question Afwerki raised is likely to grow louder. That question is whether he speaks only for Eritrea or for a wider chorus of anxious coastal capitals.
