London (Somalia Today) — Britain’s development finance institution has drawn renewed scrutiny over its minority stake in Berbera port in Somaliland, a strategic facility that Dubai-based DP World and the territory’s authorities co-own, as London ramps up pressure on commanders of Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
The UK government wholly owns British International Investment (BII) through the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office under an “arm’s-length” governance model.
BII joined the Berbera expansion project in early 2022 as part of a broader partnership with DP World to modernise ports and logistics across Africa.
The investment now sits at the intersection of two fast-moving crises: the intensifying war in Sudan, where the UAE faces persistent allegations of supporting the RSF, and a widening diplomatic row around Somaliland after Israel’s formal recognition of the self-declared republic on December 26, 2025.
Sudan war scrutiny
The UK has tried to sharpen its posture on Sudan’s conflict, imposing new measures on RSF figures it says are suspected of atrocities, including mass killings and sexual violence, in a sanctions announcement that mirrors a wider Western push for accountability.
Washington has also taken aim at the group’s leadership. The US Treasury last year designated RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo — better known as Hemedti — in a Treasury action tied to alleged abuses, including in Darfur.
At the same time, questions persist about the RSF’s access to arms and logistics networks beyond Sudan’s borders.
Reuters reported in December 2024 that Sudan and US officials accused the UAE of sending weapons to the RSF via Chad, citing regional officials and evidence the news agency reviewed in a Reuters investigation. The UAE has repeatedly denied arming the RSF.
A UN panel of experts has separately warned in its final report to the Security Council about the flow of arms and the complexity of supply lines in and around Darfur, including cross-border channels.
Against that backdrop, critics argue that UK-linked investments alongside Emirati state-connected infrastructure risk blurring the boundary between commercial development and foreign policy, particularly when ports and airports are located near military facilities.
BII says it has drawn that line clearly. In comments carried by Middle East Eye, which first detailed the UK stake, BII said it was a minority investor in Berbera’s commercial port and that the project was “entirely unconnected” to nearby Emirati military facilities, in the report.
A strategic gateway
Investors have framed Berbera’s commercial expansion as a development play with regional trade implications.
A UK-commissioned evaluation of BII’s Berbera investment described the port as a “strategic gateway” and a potential alternative trade corridor for landlocked Ethiopia, which routes most of its maritime trade through Djibouti.
The report said container handling capacity has expanded sharply since the DP World-led overhaul, while noting that demand and regional disruptions — including insecurity and shipping shocks — continue to shape the pace and scale of growth.
The strategic logic goes beyond commerce. Berbera sits on the Gulf of Aden, within reach of the Bab el-Mandeb chokepoint connecting the Red Sea to the Arabian Sea — a route the US Energy Information Administration describes as critical for global oil and gas shipments in its chokepoints analysis.
That geography has helped make Somaliland a magnet for external powers seeking access, basing options or influence across the Red Sea corridor.
Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Saar visited Somaliland on January 6, 2026, days after Israel formally recognised the territory, in a move Somalia denounced as a violation of its sovereignty.
Somalia and a group of regional states also issued statements condemning the visit and rejecting recognition, including a cross-regional joint statement hosted by Turkey’s foreign ministry and an OIC news release describing the trip as illegal.
Somaliland has sought to leverage the new opening with Israel to bolster its long-running campaign for international recognition.
The African Union and most governments back Somalia, which maintains that Somaliland remains part of the federal republic, while Mogadishu has urged foreign states to avoid official engagement in Hargeisa without its consent.
Governance questions
BII says its mandate is developmental — using capital to support jobs, infrastructure and growth in frontier markets — while operating with private-sector discipline.
Its corporate governance framework emphasises that, while the government owns it, BII makes investment decisions independently under an arm’s-length model.
For critics, the Berbera case tests how that model works in practice when commercial projects intersect with sensitive security theatres.
The stakes are heightened by the UAE’s expanding role across ports and logistics nodes in the Horn of Africa and Red Sea basin, and by the scale of alleged abuses in Sudan’s war.
UK-based rights group Amnesty International has urged tougher scrutiny of supply chains and of the risks of arms diversion linked to the UAE, arguing that the UK must tighten oversight.
In Berbera, supporters continue to market the port expansion as an engine of trade and employment.
But the surrounding politics — Sudan’s war, the UAE’s contested regional footprint, and Israel’s recognition of Somaliland — have pushed a once-technical infrastructure project into the centre of a wider geopolitical argument about influence, accountability and the cost of strategic partnerships.
